


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


28 January 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

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5. Albania, supporting Chinese Communist ideological positions, criticizes bloc parties. (Page *ii*)

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
9. Negotiations on Greek link to Common Market near decisive stage. (Page *iv*)

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11. Venezuela, faced with pressing economic problems, is seeking financial aid from US. (Page *v*)

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Albania: Albania's vigorous renewal during the past week  
of its thinly veiled public attack on Moscow's foreign policies  
and ideological views is the best indication to date that Moscow

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has not succeeded in bringing this Eastern European satellite back into line. A lead editorial in the Albanian party daily, Zeri i Popullit, on 20 January reaffirmed Tirana's contentions on the question of revisionism, publicly condemned bloc leniency toward Yugoslavia, and implicitly criticized Khrushchev and Soviet foreign policy. Thus, a little more than a fortnight before its party congress, the Albanian party has restated the deviationist position which its representatives, supporting the Chinese Communist positions, upheld at the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders. [redacted]

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**\*Greece:** [Greek association with the six-nation European Common Market (EEC)--under negotiation for nearly two years with American support--may hinge on the outcome of the 30 January meeting of the EEC's Council of Ministers. Of the few remaining obstacles to be cleared up, the most important is Greece's refusal to promise eventual settlement of its external debts--an issue in which outside interests, particularly British bondholders, are allegedly intervening. Collapse of the negotiations would be] 25X1

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[a heavy blow to the Karamanlis government, and Greek officials have previously warned that, in the absence of EEC association, Greece will have to rely even more on bloc trade.] (Backup, Page 16)

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Venezuela: The Venezuelan Government apparently failed to reach an agreement with the major oil exporting nations of the Middle East on prorating of export markets and oil price stabilization during a 16-21 January meeting in Caracas. Without guaranteed markets for its petroleum exports and facing strong competition from Middle East oil, the government may review its restrictive policies toward the key foreign-owned oil industry to encourage reinvestment and bolster oil revenues. However, the government is proceeding with the costly long-range project of developing a "competitive" national petroleum corporation to engage in all phases of industrial operations.

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President Betancourt, who is committed to moderate leftist reform, is faced with pressing economic problems which both rightist plotters and the pro-Castro opposition have already exploited. [Betancourt is seeking sizable loans from the US--apparently \$300 million or more which the minister of the treasury has frankly stated should]


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[redacted] be on a "political" basis--to reverse the three-year economic decline.] Although serious financial difficulties were inherited from the excesses of the former dictatorship and interim junta regime, they are also partly attributable to Betancourt's reluctance to risk politically unpopular corrective measures, his uncertain economic policies, particularly toward the oil industry, and the frequent political unrest in 1960.

[redacted]

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### Albania Criticizes Bloc Policies

In an editorial in the Albanian party daily on 20 January, First Secretary Hoxha spells out in explicit terms what he meant when he said his party would never compromise on questions of principle.

Albania last took public issue with bloc policies on 25 October, when Premier Mehmet Shehu criticized Bulgarian and Polish disarmament proposals and implicitly criticized Khrushchev for meeting with Tito while at the UN earlier that month. Since then, except for restating its major deviationist positions at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties last November, the regime had contented itself with defending its views rather than attacking Soviet ones.

Albanian opposition to the USSR first came into the open at the Bucharest conference of bloc Communist leaders last June, although differences have existed for several years. Since that meeting, Tirana and Peiping have frequently exchanged public expressions of mutual support and admiration. A high-level eight-man Albanian delegation now is in Peiping, apparently for the purpose of renegotiating existing trade and aid agreements.

The Zeri i Popullit editorial indirectly criticized recent Soviet statements, particularly Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech last month to the Supreme Soviet indicating Moscow's readiness to cooperate with Belgrade and maintaining that Soviet and Yugoslav positions on "fundamental international issues coincide." The editorial warned of the dangers inherent in reaching a "rapprochement" with Tito just because on "certain basic foreign policy questions. . . the Yugoslav position is identical to that of the socialist countries."

The editorial also criticized Yugoslav--and by implication bloc--condemnations of "dogmatism and sectarianism"--

labels that have been applied to Albania. In a probable reference to such criticism of Albania--for example, East German party boss Ulbricht's public attack last month on the Albanian leaders--the editorial stated that many people, including Communists, had been misled by Yugoslavia.

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Negotiations on Greek Link to Common Market Near Decision

[At its meeting on 30 January, the Council of Ministers of the European Common Market (EEC) will probably take critical decisions on the associations of Greece with the EEC. Compromises, which are still subject to council approval, appear to have been reached on most outstanding issues, but final agreement may yet founder on Greece's refusal to promise a settlement of its external debts.]

[The proposed association arrangement, the result of nearly two years of bargaining, is generally advantageous to Greece. Greek industrial exports would receive the same tariff reductions EEC members extend to each other, and special provision has been made for its major export item, tobacco--probably to the disadvantage of American tobacco exports. Mutual escape clauses have been provided, but these appear to favor Greece, and most advantageous of all, Athens would receive at least \$125,000,000 in development loans from the new European Investment Bank (EIB).]

[The EIB insists, however, that these loans not be made unless Greece agrees to indicate within two years how it proposes to settle its prewar debts--a condition Athens says is "politically unacceptable." The EIB as a new institution feels it must protect its credit position, and it has been pressed to do so by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Greek officials allege, however, that the debt issue is a subterfuge for those EEC members--notably Italy and the Netherlands--which are least enthusiastic about Greek association and have charged that British "bondholders" are responsible for the pressure from the IBRD, presumably because London is reluctant to see the Common Market extended.]

[The Karamanlis government has committed its prestige to securing Greek entry into the Common Market on "acceptable

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terms," and collapse of the negotiations on the debt issue would be a serious blow to it. Athens' relations with its Western allies would also be weakened generally, and Greek officials have warned that in the absence of a relationship with the EEC, Greek trade with the bloc would probably be accelerated. The Common Market would probably also be hurt politically, because agreement with Greece is widely regarded as a necessary prelude to the opening of talks with other potential associates such as Turkey, Israel, and Tunisia, and to renegotiation of the existing association arrangements with the former colonial areas in Africa.)

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

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Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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